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Abstract
Integrity of elections relies on fair procedures at different stages of the election process,
and fraud can occur in many instances and different forms. This paper provides a general
approach for the detection of fraud. While most existing contributions focus on a single
instance and form of fraud, we propose a more encompassing approach, testing for several
empirical implications of different possible forms of fraud. To illustrate this approach we
rely on a case of electoral irregularities in one of the oldest democracies: In a Swiss ref-
erendum in 2011, one in twelve municipalities irregularly destroyed the ballots, rendering
a recount impossible. We do not know whether this happened due to sloppiness, or to
cover possible fraudulent actions. However, one of our statistical tests leads to results,
which points to irregularities in some of the municipalities, which lost their ballots: they
reported significantly fewer empty ballots than the other municipalities. Relying on sev-
eral tests leads to the well known multiple comparisons problem. We show two strategies
and illustrate strengths and weaknesses of each potential way to deal with multiple tests.
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1 Introduction
Election fraud is not necessarily confined to young and fragile democracies states. While
a large part of the election fraud literature has looked at democratizing or non-democratic
countries, this article investigates fraud that might have occurred recently in one of the old-
est democracies,1 and aims at presenting a forensic toolbox for detection of manipulations of
ballots and the vote count. This is done based on a new, systematic empirical approach. It
is built on two theoretical insights on election or referendum fraud: first, election fraud or
misconduct can occur in many different instances of the election process, and in many different
ways. Therefore, electoral forensics are strongest when a number of different tests are con-
ducted. Second, each type of fraud is founded to a specific micro-foundation, and they should
inform the empirical tests. This has important implications for the analysis of the integrity of
elections or referendums. This approach is applied to a specific example: On February 13th
2011 the people in the Swiss canton of Berne voted on a motor tax (Motorfahrzeugsteuer).
The very close outcome sparked hope that a recount might change the final outcome, which
was granted after a legal battle. This is when the public learned that almost one in ten
municipalities had violated the electoral law and destroyed the ballots instead of retaining
them for one year Nuspliger (2011). We ask whether this was pure carelessness, or possibly
the attempt to hide electoral misconduct. Our forensic tests show that those municipalities
that have destroyed the ballots have reported surprisingly few empty ballots in the electoral
results. This paper applies several election forensic approaches to investigate the suspect that
results in the Bernese municipalities that have lost their ballots might have been manipulated.
To do so, it makes several suggestions how the electoral forensic methods might be applied in
a theory-driven way.
A quickly growing literature has developed two types of tools of vote forensics (e.g., Fil-
ippov and Ordeshook, 1996; Breunig and Goerres, 2011). One part of the literature discusses
whether the analysis of single digits of the reported electoral results at the ward level can
reveal that these numbers are based on the actual count of the votes, or whether they have
been altered, relying on Benford’s law on the frequency distribution of digits in numbers. A
second literature investigates the plausibility of electoral results from wards, and is based on
circumstantial information. This paper, first, provides a clear framework in which electoral
forensics are carried out and to move away from ad-hoc hypotheses testing towards a more
firmly rooted set of micro-foundations. This can help to derive much more precise empirical
1See also Cox and Kousser (1981) and Alvarez and Boehmke (2008).
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implications of fraud. Second, it considers that usually, election fraud does not occur in a
whole country, but is particularly likely in particular electoral wards (Alvarez and Boehmke,
2008).2 We rely on models that suggest how election outcomes look in a fair election. These
models can be tested on those municipalities where we do not expect fraud to have happened,
and we can compare the results to municipalities with possible manipulations. Furthermore,
we argue that different forms of manipulation vary in their likelihood, and tests of fraud should
start with the formulation of a micro-logic of fraud (see also Beber and Scacco (2012)).
First, we lay out the different potential ways how fraud could occur in these votes. After
deriving a micro-logic we connect each of the potential fraudulent acts with a specific tailored
test statistic. Finally, we carry out all four derived tests and show how one can combine the
different tests into an overall assessment. Substantively, we first investigate the plausibility
of the electoral result and the number of invalid and empty ballots, relying also on historical
vote data. Second, we rely on Benford’s law, focusing on the last digit of the vote figures. We
test whether voting results from those thirty municipalities which are unable to produce the
ballots show implausible distributions of the last digit.
The next section discuss the literature on electoral fraud, and introduces the referendum
of February 13th 2011. In section 3 proceeds with a discussion of statistical methods to detect
electoral fraud. We lay out a number of plausible ways in which manipulation could have
occurred which leads to the formulation of four distinct hypotheses. The results of these tests
are presented and discussed in section 4. Finally, the concluding remarks are in section 5.
2 A Systematic Approach for Electoral Forensics
Electoral fraud occurs in many different ways. The variety of forms of fraud reflects the long
list of criteria that need to be established, so that elections can be considered free and fair.
Some forms of misconduct occur before or during the election campaign, others on election day
or during the vote count; some in the central election administrations, others decentralized
(Schedler, 2002). This should be reflected in the approaches to prevent and detect fraud.
On election day, the local electoral commissions might invalidate or remove ballots, stuff the
ballot box with irregular ballots, change the content of the ballots, miscount the expressed
votes, or alter the figures ex-post.
This variety of misconduct is reflected in a variety of actors and forms of behaviour related
2See also Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shaikin (2008: 195). In contrast, in our model, the ‘fraud suspicion’
variable is exogenous to the model.
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to it, and most of all to very diverse approaches how fraud might be prevented or detected.
While the prevention of fraud relies on instruments such as multi-partisan compositions of
election commissions, transparency of the election process, exit polls, or election observers,3
the post-hoc detection of possible fraud (election forensics) is less developed. One method,
which has gained increasing attention in the literature, relies on the statistical properties of the
distribution of digits in aggregated election results, based on Benford’s law (e.g., Mebane, 2008,
2010b, 2011; Deckert, Myagkov, and Ordeshook, 2011; Beber and Scacco, 2012). Benford’s
law is suited, however, only to detect one very particular, and not always very likely form of
fraud.
Systematic forensic approaches should be interested in a variety of traces, which result from
the specific forms of electoral misconduct one wishes to detect. This has several implications.
First, forensic methods should be based on micro-logics of fraud, which are plausible in the
specific setting where the election takes place. Therefore, we first need to gain knowledge of
the electoral process, as only this allows us to identify the leeway that involved actors have
to commit fraud, and possible logics of fraud.4 Second, we can only rule out fraud, once
we investigated all possible instances and forms of it. This can not fully be implemented
in practice, as some forms of fraud might not be detectable.5 Still, it is worth to consider
the most important instances where fraud might have occurred. Third, the analysis of the
context of the election should also discuss the difficulty and effectiveness of different forms
of fraud, in order to identify those most likely to occur. A set of hypotheses, addressing the
traces of fraud, should therefore be derived from this discussion of micro-logics of fraud, and
from the discussion of their relative likelihood. Following these suggestions, we next move to
a discussion of the referendum of February 13th 2011 in the Swiss canton of Berne, and the
election and referendum authorities in this canton.
2.1 A Vote on Taxes – The Controversial Vote on Motor Vehicle Taxes
On February 13th 2011, the people of the canton of Berne were called to vote on the amend-
ment of the law on motor vehicle taxes. The vote was an optional referendum, where two
proposed amendments were opposed against each other.
3See, among others, Hyde and Marinov (2008) and Mozaffar and Schedler (2002).
4For a nice exception in the literature see the paper by Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shakin (2005) where they
employ different tests and approaches.
5And with too many parallel tests, we would most likely find some positive results, even at the absence of
fraud
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Figure 1: Reprint of a Ballot (provided by ref-
erendum committee)6
	  
The canton of Berne allows the people
to vote in such optional referendums. Gen-
erally, every new cantonal law and every
amendment of a cantonal law that is passed
by parliament is voted on in a cantonal refer-
endum, if 10,000 voters (out of some 700,000)
demand so. In 1993, the canton introduced
new referendums with people’s amendments
(Referendum mit Volksvorschlag). Now,
committees cannot only oppose a law or
an amendment of the parliament, but also
propose an alternative bill, which is voted
on. Subsequently, voters can choose be-
tween three options on their ballot: the one
proposed by the parliament, the alternative
proposition by the referendum committee
(“people’s amendment”), and the status quo.
The introduction of this new option has been
accompanied by another important change to
the voting procedure for three-option refer-
endums. On the ballots, both amendments (or new laws) are separately set in opposition to
the status quo. An additional question asks for the voters’ preferences between both reform
options (see Figure 1).
If either of both reform options tops the status quo, it wins. If both reforms are favored
over the status quo, the reform option that beats the other proposal will be enacted (see also
Bochsler, 2010). The referendum-with-people’s-amendment has substantially increased the
number of multi-option referendums.
The amendment of the motor vehicle tax bill, as proposed by the parliament of the canton
of Berne, foresaw changes of the motor vehicle taxes, which would have benefitted low-emission
vehicles, and taxed high-emission vehicles more heavily. This was opposed by a people’s
amendment, which was proposed by a committee formed around car dealers and supported
by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). Their alternative bill foresaw a general decrease of the
motor vehicle taxes. Both amendments obtained a narrow majority of approvals, so that
the tie-break question was decisive for which of the two versions would become law. This
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tie-break question was decided by a narrow margin, with 165,977 to 165,614 votes, in favor of
the people’s amendment (Table 1).
This sparked hope that a recount might change the final outcome. After a legal battle
said recount was ordered, due to the narrow result.7 This is when the public learned that
almost ten percent of the municipalities had violated the election laws by destroying the
ballots instead of retaining them for one year. 29 out of 30 municipalities, which have lost
the ballots, declare that they destroyed them due to misfortunes, or communication mistakes
Nuspliger (2011).8 The chancellor of the 30th municipality, Oberwil bei Bu¨ren, had given a
very similar declaration to the media in August 2011: Allegedly, he had destroyed the ballots
by mistake in early March (Sansoni, 2011a). Only three weeks later, he declared that he found
the destroyed ballots again (Sansoni, 2011b).
Table 1: Reported Vote Outcome
Yes No Empty
Parliament Bill 172,427 (49.01%) 154,792 (44.00%) 24,597 (6.99%)
People’s Amendment 166,860 (47.43%) 164,325 (46.71%) 20,631 (5.86%)
Parliament Bill People’s Amendment Empty
Tie-break Question 165,614 (47.07%) 165,977 (47.18%) 20,225 (5.75%)
Turnout: 49.4%
In this paper we perform a number of tests that would allow us to distinguish expected pattern
and unexpected patterns. It is surprising for outside observers that close to ten percent of the
municipalities violate electoral code and destroy ballots.
2.2 The Administration of Referendums in the Canton of Berne
After ballots have been lost, not only the result of the before mentioned referendum cannot be
verified. Possibly even more important, if ballots are lost or destroyed after referendums, this
7The Court ruling only refers to the narrow result, and does not name any irregularities, which would
motivate a recount. Urteil des Verwaltungsgerichts (Verwaltungsrechtliche Abteilung) vom 22. Juni 2011 i.S.
X. und Y. gegen Kanton Bern (VGE 100.2011.69/100.2011.86).
8According to this special report, there were a variety of reasons for the ‘loss’ of the ballots. The municipality
of Habkern claims that they had a new city manager and he was not aware of the proper procedure. The
municipality of Ringgenberg claims to have stored the old ballots in the wrong box. Finally, the administration
of Alchenstorf was doing some spring cleaning and the ballots were unfortunately thrown out by an apprentice.
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prevents any transparency in the vote counting process, and the possibility to verify that the
vote count is accurate, in general. This evokes questions about the management of referendums
in the canton of Berne, and whether the counting procedures might allow electoral fraud. The
organization of referendums is heavily decentralized. Referendums are administrated and
counted at the level of 372 wards, which almost match the 383 municipalities of the canton
(numbers of 2011).9 Many of these wards are small, 57% count less than 1000 registered voters,
and less than 6% are larger than 5,000 voters. In large municipalities, precision balances are
used to count the ballots, instead of counting them by hand, but they are only allowed if
they allow a higher degree of reliability than human counting, and if they do not involve any
rounding of the resulting number of votes.
Detailed knowledge about the counting process in practice is not available, not at least
because this process is heavily decentralized. Local all-party committees are in charge of the
administration. They are composed of non-professional members, and often supported by the
professional staff of the municipal administration. Even within the same canton, there are
important differences. The local electoral committees are elected locally, are usually multi-
partisan, but their composition is not only unknown to the cantonal authorities, but even
the rules of their composition vary: for instance, some municipalities oblige their citizens
to be part of the electoral committee, others not, and some municipalities stronger rely on
professionals in the vote count.10
The supervision of the local elections and referendum administration is exercised through
the cantonal authorities, especially through the offices of the (elected) district governors. But
they do not regularly control the vote count, especially there are no spot checks, and the
election administration at the municipal level is widely a matter of trust in local electoral
committees. The cantonal authorities stress, however, that the high frequency of elections
and referendums (there are usually around 5 elections or referendums days per year) helps
establish a professional routine, even in non-professional committees.11
Irregularities in the vote count are detected, if the results appear implausible, e.g. if the
number of votes appears conspicuously high or low, and there are routine plausibility checks
by several instances. At the absence of a proper control, we argue that other irregularities or
fraud would remain undetected. Apart from the high level of general trust in the accuracy
9Only a few very small municipalities are merged to larger counting wards.
10Information collected by Miriam Ha¨nni and Marc Bu¨hlmann.
11Practical information about the administration of elections and referendums in practice relies on an inter-
view with the State Chancellor of Bern, Kurt Nuspliger, December 20th 2011. This interview was solely about
the administrative practice and we did not discuss any fraud allegations.
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of the process, the main protection against fraud is the law, which prescribes that at no
instance of the counting process, the ballots are in the hands of only one person. While the
cantonal authorities cannot imagine that this rule is ever infringed on, there are no checks
of the counting process. The acceptance of elections and referendums is, hence, a matter
quasi-professional routine in a (non-professional) militia system and trust. Blind, or maybe
even naive trust? There is a series of limited incidents, that show that the formal rules of
democracy in Switzerland are occasionally infringed by singular actors. Occasionally, cases
where candidates cast ballots on behalf of fellow citizens, using the means of the postal
vote, come to court. Violations of the voting procedures can also be observed in the highest
authorities, e.g. the national parliament. Its first chamber (the National Council) needed to
improve its electronic voting system, after a MP was observed to cast a vote on behalf of his
seat neighbor in absence.
Finally, going back half a century there is a court ruling with regard to fraud in the counting
process. In the canton of Bern, in the municipality of Wimmis (1,734 inhabitants), in an
election in 1956, names were crossed out from the ballots, most plausibly by one member of the
election committee. While the counting process usually evolves in teams of two persons, one
member of the committee might have hindered his colleague from controlling the process, using
some of the ballots to screen his actions. Given that the counting process evolved in a chaotic
matter, many details could not be accurately establish by the court. Apparently, committee
members had also consumed alcohol during the counting process, and this apparently infringed
with the regularity of the process (Wyler, 2011). Smaller errors occur regularly. Municipal
administrations occasionally confuse the number of ’yes’ or ’no’ votes, and some electoral
committees do not know the correct procedure. Investigating the accuracy of the referendum
on motor vehicle taxes, the Administrative Court cites even one electoral committee which
did not know how to fill in the result sheets.12 This concern is even more important as there
seem to be larger differences in the handling of invalid votes, which seems only to be loosely
regulated and harmonized across the 26 Swiss cantons,13 although there is no information
with regards to the local practice. Such occasional evidence does not show any regular fraud,
but that the counting process is not very well controlled, and manipulations are possible.
For the referendum of February 13th 2011, no evidence or suspicion of fraud, which would
explain the destruction of the ballots in 30 municipalities, was made public. However, the loss
12Court decision; Urteil des Verwaltungsgerichts (Verwaltungsrechtliche Abteilung) June 22 2011 i.S. X. und
Y. gegen Kanton Bern (VGE 100.2011.69/100.2011.86), page 16.
13NZZ am Sonntag, 11.20.2011, “Bund will 33 000 ungu¨ltige Wahlzettel untersuchen” (No. 47, page 11).
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of the referendum ballots comes as a surprise, and the statements made in the investigation
report about the reasons for the destruction of the ballots, jointly with the apparently wrong
(and later corrected) statements in the press, undermine our trust in the counting process.
Local committees might have a particular motive in losing the ballots if such a recount was
to reveal irregularities in the counting process.14
3 Detecting Fraud
How can we detect electoral fraud? The answer to this question depends on the type of
committed fraud. Lacking access to the proof (the ballot papers), researchers have started
to develop statistical methods to detect irregularities in the reported election results, which
might be due to illegitimate manipulations.
Fraud can occur in almost all steps of the election process, and in many different ways, and
each way requires its own methodology to detect it. Note that the distinction of acceptable
and illegitimate practices has changed over time, and varies across countries and regions.
Today, democracies usually consider vote buying illegal and illegitimate, while practices of
patronage, which involve violations of the vote secrecy are more widespread.15
In this paper, we focus at the level of the ward, and on the role of the local electoral
committee, i.e. the vote count and the reporting of the electoral result (in Switzerland this
is mostly the municipality level). Fraud at the ward level can occur by altering individual
ballots after they have been cast, invalidating valid ballots (or validating invalid ones), or by
forging the ballot return sheet and changing the numbers.
In general, there are two ways to go about detecting electoral fraud. We focus on the
returns at the lowest levels possible and we try to compare outcomes with expectations. The
origins of these expectations distinguishes the two instruments we have. First, we may rely
on ecological information. Knowing the political structure of a village may allow us to predict
the voting pattern we should observe (Alvarez and Boehmke, 2008). This approach relies on
regression style models based on a subsample where we can (with large confidence) outrule
fraud.
Second, we can focus solely on the return sheets (the reported numbers). We compare
14It is heavily implausible that all 30 municipalities have coordinated the destruction of the ballots, and/or
done so for the same motive. Carelessness might be an important reason in some of the municipalities, but we
cannot exclude that others destroyed the ballot to hinder a recount.
15See Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 15-9). A relevant part in the democratic development of Imperial
Germany is the absence of the secret ballot and the opportunities to ‘bread lords’ (employers) to threaten
voters into voting differently (e.g., Ziblatt, 2009; Anderson, 2000).
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these figures not with other returns but with a theoretical distribution of digits. As it turns
out, our interest will lie mostly in the last digits which are inconsequential for the outcome
but can be an invaluable source to detect fraud. The basic idea is that when someone makes
up numbers they fail to produce numbers that are truly random in the way they would be in
a truly fair election or vote. But before diving into the empirical tests we derive a number of
micro-logics which provide the micro-foundations.
3.1 The Micro-Logic of Fraud
We do not know what happened on February 13th 2011. However, a rich literature of election
research provides us with different models that help to predict the outcome of the referendum
of the 13 February 2011. We can test these models for optional referendums in the canton
of Berne, and we can test whether there were any irregularities in the results of the 30 mu-
nicipalities that lost their ballots. Therefore, we construct several fictitious scenarios of how
an election committee might have manipulated the ballots – each of which require a different
degree of criminal energy.
It is of central importance that an investigation is based on a micro-logic of how such
potential fraud occurs. We derive four different possibilities and show how we can test for
each of them. The derivation is guided by findings of the criminology literature on white-
collar crimes (Bannenberg and Jehle, 2010). This body of theories is often referred to as the
fraud triangle (Cressey, 1980) and regards the likelihood of fraud to depend on opportunity,
motivation, and rationalization. Hence, we focus on the effectiveness and severeness of fraud
(directly and inversely related to rationalizability) and the amount of criminal energy necessary
(motivation) to commit such fraud.
The first potential fraud form we highlight is specific to referendums with tie-break ques-
tions. The easiest way to falsify the Bernese ballot is to add a cross on the empty tie break
question, while for the other referendum questions, a full word needs to be added. The tie-
break question is at least as important as the other two questions on the ballot, and it is often
decisive for the outcome of the referendum. There is considerable potential for manipulation,
as voters frequently miss to correctly fill in such a ballot (see Figure 1) and leave the last
question out, as a YES and a NO (or vice versa) seems to imply a clear preference.16 But
despite two clear answers to the two proposals at stake, the voter is obliged to say which one
she prefers if both obtain a popular majority. The first manipulation occurs when officials fill
16This has also led to legislative action in the past where a part of the Social Democrats of the cantonal
legislature demanded a change of the ballot structure (Wasserfallen, 2011).
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in left-out tie break responses. Despite this being a fraudulent act it is not hard to see how
an official could actually believe to be doing something good as she is not tempering with the
intention of the voter. Manipulating empty fields in the tie-break question is also the easiest
way to manipulate the Bernese ballot, as only one cross needs to be added to the empty field,
while for the other referendum questions, a full word has to be added - yielding a higher risk
because the different handwritings might be detected. This subjectively least severe form of
fraud requires little to no criminal energy.
A second form of fraudulent behavior can be observed when officials fill in empty response
fields for the first two proposals. This is more severe because unlike the first category this
cannot be justified by trying to help the voter express her preferences. The third form of
manipulation requires more criminal energy and is found when an official changes the response
on the ballot. This is what happened in the described fraud case in Wimmis (see page 8).
This not only requires more criminal energy but is also more severe as it is an act that directly
contradicts the voter’s choice. A forth and final possibility is to simply misreport the results
of their ward and report different totals to the next bureaucratic level. This blunt contempt
of the voters’ preferences is the strongest form of fraud in terms of severeness and criminal
energy.
These four potential forms lead to a number of hypotheses which can be tested. The first
three forms can be tested with a correlational approach in which we specify a parametric
model which predicts an outcome variable (e.g. the number of empty ballots) and we include
an indicator variable which takes on the value ‘1’ for those municipalities that are at the center
of this investigation. Hence, we compare the municipalities which kept all ballots to those
that did not and see if they systematically deviate. The forth form of fraud can be tested by
relying on Benford’s law which allows under certain circumstances to discriminate between
naturally evolving numbers and made-up reported numbers.
Hypothesis 1: The number of empty ballots for the tie break question is lower for the
municipalities which ‘’lost” the ballots than for those which were able to produce the
ballots for a recount when controlling for other covariates.
Hypothesis 2: The number of empty ballots for the two proposal questions is lower for
the municipalities which ‘lost’ the ballots than for those which were able to produce the
ballots for a recount when controlling for other covariates.
Some municipalities which lost their ballots might have altered the ballots, or written in new
content (in any of the three referendum questions). Therefore, in lost-ballot-municipalities,
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the aggregated results should deviate from the expected results. As manipulations might have
occurred in different directions, we expect that the results of the lost-ballot-municipalities are
more difficult to explain, compared to other municipalities.
Hypothesis 3: The variance of the regression error of the municipalities which lost
ballots is higher than the variance from the other municipalities.
Finally, to test for the most severe form of electoral fraud, we perform a test which is able
to detect made up numbers and should indicate fraud if the 30 municipalities reported phony
digits.
Hypothesis 4: The distribution of the last digit of the reported yes and no votes does
not follow the theoretical distribution (Benford) for those municipalities which ‘lost’ the
ballots.
In terms of assessing the likelihood we rely on rationalizability and criminal energy. We
operate under the prior that the behavior described in hypothesis 1 and 2 is more likely than
what is underlying hypothesis 3. The least likely micro-logic is captured in hypothesis 4.
Given that empty tie-break questions can be perceived as being left out by mistake, but are
still important (rationalizability), even though there is very little criminal energy necessary
for altering them, one can argue that this is the most likely form of fraud. On the other hand,
blatantly misreporting the vote totals is logistically difficult to do (as there are more than one
person observes the vote totals prior to submitting them) as well as it is hard to rationalize.
In the following two paragraphs we lay out how we can test these four hypotheses. Note,
that the hypotheses assume fraud and if we eventually reject the null hypotheses that would
constitute circumstantial evidence for irregularities.
3.2 Detecting Different Forms of Fraud
3.2.1 Ecological Approach to Test the First Three Hypotheses
First, we predict the referendum result for each ward (i.e. mostly identical with municipal-
ities), and we analyze the deviations from this prediction. We expect that the deviations
from the expectations should be most pronounced for the 30 municipalities, which lost their
ballots, as explained in hypotheses 1 to 3. The three hypotheses relate to different aspects of
the election results (dependent variables): hypothesis 3 relates to the accuracy of the model
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prediction (unexplained variance of the yes/no votes), while hypotheses 1 and 2 relate to the
number of empty ballots.
The literature of election research provides us with different models that help to predict
the outcome of the referendum in February 2011. We can test these models for this particular
and several other optional referendums in the canton of Bern, and we can test whether there
were any irregularities in the results of the 30 municipalities that lost their ballots. As we have
constructed several fictitious scenarios how an election committee might have manipulated the
ballots, each of them requires a different effort to test whether a manipulation might have
occurred.
Three types of control models can be helpful to predict the referendum results in an
optional referendum. The first model (interdependence of referendum questions) states that
the answers to the three referendum questions on the same ballot are not independent from
each other. On the one hand, certain voters who reject both proposed amendments of the
law might renounce from answering the tie-break question on the ballot. On the other hand,
voters who reject one of the two bills might not answer the tie-break question, because they
misunderstand the meaning of the tie break question, and do not realize that everybody is
entitled to answer it.17 Also, certain voters might be more inclined to leave several of the
questions on the ballot unanswered, so that the number of empty fields should correlate on
the ballots, and within the municipalities. Therefore, we have expectations about correlations
between the results of the three questions on the same ballot.
The second model (historical model) states that there are local, idiosyncratic characteris-
tics that might explain parts of the results, and these aspects should be constant in all optional
referendums in the last few years. Especially, if certain voters repeatedly cast empty ballots,
then the number of empty ballots should correlate across referendums. The third model (party
model) argues that referendum results can be explained with the partisan composition of the
electorate. All optional referendums considered in this study were politicized along party
divides. The referendum committees, which are proposing the people’s amendment, are often
formed or at least heavily supported by political parties. Therefore, the party preferences of
the electorate are an important predictor of referendum results. Each of these models works
for different types of dependent variables, and therefore, each can only be applied to two
hypotheses.
17The ballot states that the tie-break question applies if the two amendments should both be accepted.
Voters might misunderstand this statement, and assume that this applies to individual ballots. Hence, they
might not answer the tie-break question, if they rejected either of the two amendments (see also Wasserfallen,
2011).
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Our set of further control variables includes the language spoken in the municipality (bi-
nary indicator variable for French, as opposed to German), and the size of the electorate in
the municipality (we use the logarithm of the number of registered voters),18 which should
also control for possible population effects.
The first set of hypotheses (hypothesis 1 and 2) refers to the mean number of empty
votes registered per municipalities. We expect that possible manipulation might decrease the
number of empty ballots. Therefore, we rely on models that explain the mean share of empty
ballots as a percentage of all ballots cast in the referendum in the particular electoral ward. We
estimate the models with Goodman regression models for ecological data (Goodman, 1959).
These are based on OLS models with robust standard errors, and assume linear effects. As
using OLS on fractional data comes with a certain cost, we also rerun the models in table 4
and 5 while relying on a fractional logit model as described in Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
As our control models are solely aimed at giving accurate predictions of the outcomes, we are
indifferent for whether the observed effects are contextual, or occur at the individual level.
Goodman regressions and fractional logic models allow us to test models with several explana-
tory variables, including variables that are not based on aggregate statistics of individuals, in
our case dummy variables for French-speaking municipalities and for the municipalities that
lost their ballots.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are thus tested in the following model, where X are the variables in-
cluded in the control model, and ∆lostballots indicates the municipalities that lost their ballots.
y = β0 +β′X + βLB ⋅∆lostballots + ε
As hypothesis 3 relates to the variance part of the estimates, and not to the mean, we need
to test it using variance models. They are based on a maximum likelihood estimator that
establishes the parameters of the outcome term and the variance simultaneously (Davidian
and Carroll, 1987; Braumoeller, 2006). X is a matrix of explanatory variables for the mean
function; Z is the matrix of control variables for the variance function. Both, β and γ, are
vectors of parameters for both functions, αµ is the constant in the mean term, and ασ the
constant in the variance term.
Again, we include terms for the size of municipalities (number of registered voters), and a
18The size of the municipality also serves as a proxy for different types of communities. If we assume that
the size of municipalities affects the electoral returns, we find it plausible that the effect on the vote share in a
referendum rather follows the relative increase in size of a municipality, rather than an absolute increase. The
effect is not altered if the number of registered voters is not transformed.
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dummy variable for French-speaking municipalities in the variance part of the model, because
we expect that predictions of voting results might be more accurate in larger municipalities.
y ∼ N(µ,σ2)
µ = αµ +β′X + βLB ⋅∆lostballots
σ2 = exp(ασ + γ′Z + γLB ⋅∆lostballots)
We first run the three models for earlier cases of optional referendums in the canton of Berne.
This allows us to select the models that have the best explanatory power, and to maximize
the accuracy of the predictions of the municipal referendum results. Thereafter, we run the
models in order to examine the results of the referendum on February 13th 2011.
To rule out a possible endogeneity of the 30 selected municipalities, we have tested several
hypotheses (partisan approach, size of the municipalities, language group, and interactions of
these variables), in order to explain why certain municipalities might have lost their ballots.
None of these hypotheses is able to contribute to the explanation of the losses of the ballots.
3.2.2 Digit Based Test for Hypothesis 4 – Can Benford Help?
Recently, Benford’s law has been applied by several social scientists to distinguish between
genuine numbers and ‘made-up’ or ‘manufactured data’ (Diekmann, 2007; Mebane, 2010b).
It has been shown over and over again, that when individuals make up numbers they tend to
pick too often some digits and other digits are chosen too rarely. This psychological bias – the
inability to truly pick random numbers – can be exploited for a forensic test. Benford reports
in a paper from 1938 that the first couple of pages of a table of common logarithms are used
far more often than others (Benford, 1938).19 This sparked his interest in the frequency of
specific digits. Benford derived a distribution that describes amazingly well the frequency of
digits for many different processes (Diekmann, 2007; Raimi, 1969).
The first digit of a number follows according to Benford’s law a simple distribution where
the digit ‘1’ is more probable than the digit ‘2’, the digit ‘2’ is then more frequent than the
digit ‘3’ and so on. The distribution is defined as P (zi) = log10 (1 + 1zi ), hence the probability
to find the digit ‘2’ should be p(zi = 2) = log10 (1 + 12) = 0.176. That means that if digits
actually would follow a Benford distribution almost one out of five digits should be a two.
It should not be overlooked that Benford provides more than just a distribution for the
first digit. Benford provides a probability mass function for any digit at any position (p:
19The observation that the first couple of pages seem used more is ascribed to Newcomb (1881).
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position, d: digit). Equation (1) describes the probabilities for the leading digit and equation
(2) describes the probabilities for any digit at any position if p > 1 (not leading):
P (Z1 = d) = log10 (1 + 1d) (1)
P (Zp = d) = 10p−1∑
i=10p−2 log10 (1 + 110i + d) (2)
In a review essay Hill (1995) describes many different processes which seem to follow a Benford
distribution (e.g. physical constants, population of counties, income tax data). On top of that
Hill also offers an explanation based on a variant of the central limit theorem assuming that
all numbers stem from a random selection of random variables.20
It is important to highlight that the frequency of any digit d depends on its position.
The digit “1” has a probability of about 0.3 to appear as the first digit, while it has only
a probability of about 0.1 to appear if we are looking at the forth digit. The following plot
(Figure 2) illustrates the probabilities for first, second, third, and forth digits.
Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities
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b) Benford 2nd Digit
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c) Benford 3rd Digit
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d) Benford 4th Digit
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Notes: The blue bars display the frequencies according to Benford’s law. The gray bars
indicate a uniform distribution.
20For a extensive review of the mathematical literature see Raimi (1976).
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Table 7 (Appendix) shows the distributions for the first four digits according to Benford’s
law. From Figure 2 we see that the first digit follows a distinct non-uniform distribution
but as we move back in position (increasing p) we find that the distribution approximates a
uniform. It can be shown that the as p→∞ the distribution is uniform (Hill, 1995).
The discussion of Benford’s law so far may give the impression that we can use it to
detect fraud on return sheets. If people in charge of reporting the results from the ward
level manipulate the numbers, we might be able to detect that. Unfortunately, Benford’s
law does not say that every series of numbers follows automatically a Benford distribution.
Phone numbers for example do not follow Benford’s law.21 The first digit of vote return data
might not always stem from Benford’s law (Mebane, 2008; Deckert, Myagkov, and Ordeshook,
2011). In a recent article Deckert, Myagkov, and Ordeshook (2011) argue against the use of
Benford’s law based on using the mean of the second digits and extensive simulations (see also
Shikano and Mack, 2011). Whereas we do not doubt their results, we want to highlight that
we are not performing any tests on the means of digits nor on the second digit (Mebane, 2011).
Instead, we follow Beber and Scacco (2012) in focussing on the last digit and an emphasis on
a micro-logic of fraud.
3.2.3 Testing Digits
Hence, we rely on Benford’s law only for the last few digits and dismiss the first and second
digit. We will use Benford’s law while focussing on the last digits; the inconsequential ones.
One may argue that focussing on third and forth digits would be meaningless because elections
are not won by altering those numbers. But if numbers are made up entirely, we expect that
little care is given to the last digits and we should find significant deviations in the frequencies
of digits.22
Regardless whether care is given or not to fraudulent return sheets, humans are almost
incapable of generating good fake data. A large number of experimental research shows that
individuals are incapable of producing pseudo-random numbers (see Beber and Scacco, 2012,
for an extensive overview of the experimental literature). This inability is of great value to
election analysts which would like to test vote reports for accuracy.
To test whether digits follow a specific distribution or not we need a test statistic. We will
21Diekmann (2007) rejects the use of the first digit based Benford test for coefficients in published articles.
His objective is to detect academic fraud and he argues to only use the second digit.
22Beber and Scacco (2012) argue forcefully for the use of last digits and rely on a uniform distribution.
Since Benford essentially is uniform for later digits (third or more) Beber and Scacco are supporting the use
of Benford’s law on last digits.
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use a common χ2 test (see e.g. Snedecor and Cochran, 1989). This test is only asymptotically
valid as many other tests. This Pearson χ2-test computes the weighted squared deviations
from the theoretical expectation for each digit and sums it up. Readers familiar for the χ2-test
for n ×m tables will see the similarity between the two tests since the basic idea is the same.
The basic idea is that if the data we are dissecting is similar to the theoretical prediction
we expect the differences to be about 0 and the test statistic should be small. Let ti be the
expected frequency of observed digit i and let zi be the frequency of observations of i:
B = 9∑
i=0
(zi − ti)2
ti
(3)
B ∼ χ29 (4)
This test statistic B follows under the null hypothesis - that the data measured in zi stem
from the theoretical expectation - a χ2-distribution with 9 degrees of freedom. A potential
weakness of testing Benford’s law with χ2 test is that the power of such a test hinges on the
sample size.23 This is not a concern if one inspects a large number of wards or municipalities,
but becomes a problem when the sample size is small. In the application which follows we
use this test for a subset of municipalities and the smallest sample has only 30 observations.
The draw-back is that failure to reject the null hypothesis can be because the data follows the
theoretical distribution well but can also be due to a lack of statistical power. This has to be
taken into account when interpreting the test results.
If we were looking at the nth digit and n would be large, the theoretical distribution
is uniform, hence ti = t = 1/10 ∀ i. In our application we will encounter votes from small
municipalities with a few hundred votes but also larger ones with more than a thousand votes.
Hence, the last digit falls on the third, fourth, or rarely even the fifth position. Instead of
brushing away the inconvenience we derive for every case the appropriate mixture distribution
(usually based on 3rd and 4th digits). Details on deriving the mixture distribution are provided
in the appendix (A.3).
23There are however small sample correction factors for some alternative tests, which should increase test
power. One such alternative is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test (see Stephens, 1970, for an adjusted critical
value). Even though this test is for continuous distributions there exists the claim that one can also adjust for
discrete distributions (see a working paper by Morrow, 2010). The problem here is that all K-S related tests
have low power if the distribution is not trend shaped but rather multimodal (Pettitt and Stephens, 1977).
However, we show the performance of the two tests for a specific distribution and show why we rely for this
application the Pearson χ2 test (see appendix A.2).
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4 Results
This paper proposes two different approaches to deal with vote return data. Both approaches
are based on the basic idea that we have two sets of municipalities; the ones that followed the
law and kept the ballots and the other municipalities which did not do so. Both approaches
(ecological and digit based) are used to investigate whether the two groups are distinct. If loos-
ing or destroying ballots was a mistake we would expect that the subgroup of municipalities,
who lost ballots, would perform the same way on both tests. But if these thirty municipalities
have very atypical vote returns, this would raise suspicion whether actually fraudulent acts
were committed and the ballots not lost but rather destroyed to render a recount unfeasible.
4.1 Berne 2011 – Ecological Tests
The first three hypotheses address the questions, whether the 30 municipalities have reported
lower figures of empty ballots, referendum results which deviate more strongly from the ex-
pectations, compared to the other municipalities. Therefore, we first estimate control models
to predict the number of empty ballots and to predict the vote returns. We test these models
on four referendums with optional questions (see appendix A.5 for a list), before we will use
them to estimate whether there is statistical evidence for any of the three hypotheses on the
referendum results on February 13th 2011 (for hypotheses 2 and 3, the tests of the control
models for the four other referendums are reported in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10.) We
first discuss the results for hypothesis 1, according to which we expect fewer empty votes cast
for the tie-break questions. The historical model (number of empty votes in previous optional
referendums) performs badly. However, we can explain the number of empty votes for the
tie-break question based on the interdependence of referendum questions. We argue that the
voters’ decisions on questions that were asked on the same ballot, and for the same matter,
can be related to each other (see above, subsubsection 3.2.1). First, we have the control model
for four reference cases, as reported in Table 2.
In all four cases, the model contributes considerably to the explanation of the empty ballots
in the tie-break questions. All included variables are statistically significant for at least some
of the four optional referendums, and explain up to 64% of the explained variance. The model
also performs well for the referendum of February 13th 2011, on motor vehicle taxes. After
controlling for the correlations within the electoral ballots, the 30 municipalities that lost
their ballots still show some deviating results. On the average, we count 0.2 to 1.4%24 fewer
24Given an effect of 0.8 percent points, a RMSE of 0.3%, and a 95% coverage.
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Table 2: Explanation of the empty ballots in the tie-break question (H1)
Public Hospital Taxes Energy Motor Vehicle
Employees Taxes
(control case) (control case) (control case) (control case) (test case)
Empty – PB 0.090 0.168* 0.065 0.017 0.165*
(0.076) (0.080) (0.080) (0.040) (0.069)
Empty – P’sA 0.377** 0.381** 0.314** 0.027 0.385**
(0.075) (0.099) (0.067) (0.104) (0.100)
‘yes’– PB -0.239** -0.280** -0.104* -0.048* -0.298**
(0.036) (0.029) (0.042) (0.019) (0.041)
‘yes’– P’sA -0.189** -0.227** -0.133** -0.117** -0.290**
(0.045) (0.039) (0.051) (0.032) (0.042)
French (d) 0.008 0.006 0.019** 0.005 0.014**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Reg. voters (log) 0.000 0.002(*) -0.001 0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Lost ballots 0.010 -0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.008*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
constant 0.251** 0.291** 0.168** 0.115** 0.297**
(0.038) (0.035) (0.057) (0.032) (0.041)
N 372 372 372 372 372
R2 0.475 0.646 0.305 0.151 0.553
Note: OLS and robust standard errors. PB = Parliamentary Bill, P’sA = People’s Amendment.
(log)=logarithm, (d) = dummy. ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, and (∗) p < 0.1.
empty fields for the tie-break question, compared to similar ballots cast in other municipalities.
Hence, we find that there was an effect diminishing the number of empty fields for the tie-break
questions in those municipalities that have lost their ballots. The reasons for this difference
can not be answered in this paper. While one option is (as hypothesized) that crosses might
have been added to the empty fields of the tie-break questions, the effect might also have
emerged from a different practice of distinguishing valid from invalid votes. Based on the
18,162 ballots that were cast in the 30 concerned municipalities, the overall effect might be
anywhere in between 30 and 250 votes. We have also re-run the models relying on fractional
logit model, and results substantially remain the same.
Second, we build models that explain the number of empty votes for all three referendum
questions. These models allow us to evaluate whether possibly in the 30 municipalities that
lost their ballots, empty fields on the ballots were filled in general. This time, we need a
different control model: we are investigating a possible manipulation that might have affected
the number of empty ballots for any of the three referendum questions, or all three simultane-
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ously. As a consequence, we cannot rely anymore on the inter-dependency of the referendum
questions within the same ballot for the control model. Instead, we rely on the historical
model, and investigate whether the level of empty ballots in municipalities can be explained
with the records from the last earlier optional referendum. As for hypothesis 1, we first tested
the explanatory power of the model, relying solely on earlier optional referendum. In some
cases, the number of empty ballots correlates between the two referendums, and the control
model covers some 10-20% of the observed variance (see Table 8 in A.6).
We use the same model to predict the number of empty ballots in the referendum of
February 13th 2011, with the tax referendum of February 24th 2008 as our lagged case. As
there are three referendum questions, this results in three separate models for the empty votes
for each of the three questions (see Table 3). The explanatory power of the model is weak, for
all three dependent variables, and there is no statistically significant effect of the lost ballot
municipalities. The substantial magnitude of this effect remains very similar as in the previous
analysis (see Table 2), but given the high standard error of the model, it is not statistically
significant. We have performed several robustness checks, which did not alter the results.25
Results do not change if we take other optional referendums as reference (see Table 9 in A.6).
Finally, we wonder whether we can find any effect on the valid (i.e. non-empty) votes. We
did not hypothesize how the vote might have been manipulated, but if some of the lost ballot
municipalities have manipulated the referendum, their results should be less well predictable
than those of other municipalities (hypothesis 3).
Again, not knowing which of the three referendum questions might have been manipulated,
the control model that is based on the inter-dependence of the three referendum questions
is not applicable. Therefore, we have tested two control models, relying on the national
parliamentary elections of 2007,26 and on voting patterns in previous optional referendums.
We include terms for the size of municipalities (number of registered voters), and a dummy
variable for French-speaking municipalities in the variance part of the model, because we
expect that predictions of voting results might be more accurate in larger municipalities.
25First, we have taken other optional references as lagged reference cases (see Table 9 in A.6). Second, we
also rerun the models in table 4 and 5 while relying on a fractional logit model. The results are substantively
identical although the exact numbers slightly change, but direction and significance level for all coefficients
remain unchanged.
26In national parliamentary elections, the whole canton of Berne is a single electoral district. Differently, in
the cantonal elections of 2006/2010, there were 8/9 electoral districts, so that the offer of electoral lists varies
widely, and affects the electoral returns for the major parties. We rely on the national parliamentary election
results of 2007 for all referendums from 2004 to 2011, as we are mainly interested in a good fit of the control
variables, whereas causality is a minor concern for the control models.
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Table 3: Explanation of the empty ballots in all question (H2)
TAXES Parliamentary People’s Tie-Break
Bill Amendment Question
Empty – PB 0.108(*) 0.004 0.067
(0.060) (0.052) (0.064)
Empty – P’sA -0.043 0.093 0.031
(0.077) (0.059) (0.096)
Empty – TBq 0.174** 0.036 0.133*
(0.064) (0.052) (0.057)
French (d) 0.001 -0.007 0.019**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Reg. voters (log) -0.003(*) 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lost ballots -0.001 0.000 -0.007
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
constant 0.080** 0.047** 0.049**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
N 372 372 372
R2 0.091 0.040 0.146
Note: OLS and robust standard errors. PB = Parliamentary Bill, P’sA = People’s Amendment,
TBq = Tie=break Question. (log)=logarithm, (d) = dummy. ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, and (∗)
p < 0.1.
The explanatory power27 of the party composition of the municipalities varies for different
referendum topics, between 30% (referendum on hospitals of 2005) and 70% (energy law of
2011) (see Table 10 in A.6). The results remain widely the same, if we logit-transform the
parties’ vote shares and the vote shares in the referendum.28
We have further searched for municipalities for which this control model has already lead to
non-accurately explained predictions in earlier referendums. We have run the control model
on earlier referendums, as included the residual from these models as a lagged variable in
the variance part of the model for later referendums. Neither are effects statistically signifi-
cant, nor does this historical model contribute to the explanatory power. Therefore, we have
refrained from applying it to the referendum of February 13th 2011.
The main model (Table 4), including a dummy variable to identify the lost ballot mu-
27As measured by a quasi-R2 measure (VWLS R2).
28The logit-transformation was performed for all percentage variables, i.e. vote shares in referendum and
elections and turnout, following Greene (1993, p. 837). While Greene suggests to correct unanimous votes,
by increasing/decreasing them at a small constant rate, so that these cases are not dropped in the logit
transformation, we have added one yes and one no vote to all voting results, so that none of the results is
unanimous any more. Both the transformed and the non-transformed model have similarly good fits, and
we detect no sign for clear non-linearities in the function in the graphical display of residuals. We have not
performed similar logit-transformations for the tests of hypotheses 3 and 4, as we believe that the effects
underlying the models are clearly linear in their nature.
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Table 4: Explanation of the referendum results (share of yes vote), party-political model (H3):
Referendum Motor vehicle taxes
Parliamentary People’s Tie-break
Bill Amendment Question
Main part
Votes SVP % -0.085 0.062 -0.085
(0.059) (0.062) (0.065)
Votes SP % 0.145* -0.075 0.143(*)
(0.067) (0.07) (0.075)
Votes FDP % 0.305** -0.203** 0.263**
(0.071) (0.067) (0.074)
Votes GPS % 0.887** -0.942** 0.975**
(0.079) (0.077) (0.088)
Turnout elections 0.393** -0.355** 0.457**
(0.055) (0.061) (0.059)
Turnout refer. -0.156* 0.200** -0.230**
(0.064) (0.071) (0.067)
Lost ballots (d) -0.008 0.004 -0.006
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Reg. voters (log) 0.010** -0.011** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
French (d) -0.086** 0.040** -0.080**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
constant 0.142* 0.778** 0.129*
(0.062) (0.060) (0.064)
Variance part
Lost ballots (d) 0.559(*) 0.143 0.271
(0.297) (0.291) (0.331)
Reg. voters (log) -0.531** -0.660** -0.499**
(0.076) (0.089) (0.120)
French (d) -0.229 -0.248 -0.228
(0.24) (0.254) (0.264)
constant -2.44** -1.391* -2.566**
(0.532) (0.590) (0.780)
N 372 372 372
Model χ210 414.092 330.111 399.456
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 -0.5454 -0.4184 -0.5322
VWLS R2 0.7641 0.7371 0.7507
Note: Variance model with robust standard errors. (log)=logarithm, (d) = dummy. ∗∗ p < 0.01,∗ p < 0.05, and (∗) p < 0.1.
nicipalities in the variance part, does not give any statistical evidence that the results might
have been manipulated. The dummy variable is not significant in any of the three models.
This means that the results from the lost ballot municipalities do not deviate more from the
model’s prediction than the results from other municipalities. This, while the control model
is very powerful as a predictor of the referendum results in February 2011, with 74% to 76%
(variance-weighted) explanatory power. We find no evidence for hypotheses 2 and 3, but we
do find patterns consistent with the behavior described in hypothesis 1.
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4.2 Berne 2011 – Digit-based Tests
In this section we test hypothesis 4. It states that the last digits of the reported numbers
is in line with the theoretical expectation and follows a Benford distribution as laid out in
subsubsection 3.2.2. The fourth hypothesis is based on fraudulent behavior of the official
reporting the results to the next administrative level. If fraud occurred in such a manner
in those municipalities which illegally disposed the ballots too early, we expect that the last
digits of the reported votes does not follow a Benford distribution. If fraud actually occurred
by misreporting the final numbers we should find no significant test statistic for the 342
municipalities which kept the ballots but would expect to find significant test statistics for
the 30 municipalities which disposed the ballots. Due to the small sample size of the second
group it is possible that even if fraud occurred that one would not detect it in this case due
to the low power of the test (see subsubsection 3.2.3).
Table 5: Digit Based Test - 342 Municipalities (H4)
Parliament People’s Tie-break
Bill Amendment Question
yes no yes no P B P’s A
Test Value (χ29) 6.12 12.84 4.74 9.22 8.18 24.88
p−value 0.728 0.170 0.856 0.417 0.516 0.003*
Benford? ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ "
df 9 9 9 9 9 9
N 342 342 342 342 342 342
Our results do not coincide with this expectation. In Table 5 we perform six χ2 tests on
the reported votes from the 342 municipalities which kept the ballots. To provide a reading
example we look at the test for the reported ‘yes’ votes on the parliament bill: The test
statistic is 6.12 which corresponds to a p-value of 0.73 (df=9). Given a confidence level of 0.05
we fail to reject the null hypothesis (digits stem from a Benford distribution).
For five out of the six tests we fail to reject the hypothesis (H4), i.e. the observed dis-
tribution is not different from Benford’s Law. But, we fail to reject H4 for the vote on the
People‘s Amendment in the tie-break question. This is not in line with our expectations,
and it raises the question whether this test is valid. In principle, there are two possibilities
why one would find a significant test statistic even if there was no fraud; first, the large test
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statistic is a type-I error, and second, the test is not valid. Unusual cases, where the test leads
to statistically significant results, although no fraud is expected or suspected, are reported in
the literature.29 The second possibility is that the test is not appropriate for digits stemming
from a tie-break question. It is known that certain circumstances can lead fraud-free election
results to not conform to the theoretical distribution.30 But as laid out above, we explicitly
focus on the last digit as it should be unaffected by the known issues. Finally, if there was
a specific mechanism at work (yet unknown) which would lead the last digits of a tie-break
question to not conform with the theoretical expectation we would expect to also find a large
test statistic for other tie-break questions (such as the ones in Table 2) but this is not the case.
Altogether, there is no reason to expect the test being inappropriate for tie-break questions.
Table 6: Digit Based Test - 30 Municipalities (H4)
Parliament People’s Tie-break
Bill Amendment Question
yes no yes no
Test Value (χ29) 6.48 4.34 5.02 8.02 15.39 8.59
p−value 0.691 0.888 0.833 0.533 0.081 0.476
Benford? ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
df 9 9 9 9 9 9
N 30 30 30 30 30 30
In Table 6 we show the same eight hypothesis tests for the subsample of municipalities which
did not keep the ballots and prevented thereby a recount. If we think that these municipalities
forged the vote results by changing the numbers, we would expect to find that the χ2 test
statistic significantly deviating from 0. In all six cases we find a small χ2 value which is lower
than the critical threshold (for an α level of 0.05 and 9 degrees of freedom it is 16.92). As
mentioned in subsubsection 3.2.3, the power of this test is small due to the very small sample
of only 30 observations
Based on the results of the digit based tests, we do not find any meaningful deviations.
Keeping in mind the low power of this test, the absence of evidence is not evidence to the
29An example of this is found in Mebane (2008, 171-172) where he finds significant deviations for Los Angeles
county and three other counties in the US.
30Note that all known anomalies causing digits to not follow the theoretical distribution are concerned with
the first or second digit. This may be due to strategic voting (Mebane, 2010a) or that some vote machines are
only used during peak hours (roughly equal division with leftovers, REDLW, see Mebane, 2006).
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contrary. It simply means that one possibility how one could have detected fraudulent elections
did not provide evidence for fraud.
4.3 Combining Multiple Hypothesis Tests
The last two paragraphs present the results of the carried out empirical tests. Each of these
tests provide a test statistic for a specific hypothesis. The specific hypotheses were e.g.
whether empty ballots were manipulated (hypothesis 1) or whether officials misreported vote
totals (hypothesis 4). We find all together evidence for one of the four postulated hypotheses,
namely that empty ballots were filled in after they had been casted.
The general interest in a paper of electoral forensics does not uniquely lie in distinguishing
which form of fraud occurred but also whether fraud occurred at all or not. How should
one treat the multiple tests? There are two extreme alternatives; first, one could treat each
hypothesis as fully independent and derive a combined test statistic under a null hypothesis.
But fraud may only occur in one specific way – hence, a highly fraudulent election in which
only precincts misreport vote totals (and no other form of fraud) can go by undetected. The
second alternative is to forego the issue of multiple testing and to claim that whenever one
finds a positive test statistic it has to be proof of fraud. The problem with this approach
increases as well in the number of carried out hypothesis test. Since we employ the null-
hypothesis-significance-testing we are bound to have positive results if the number increases
sufficiently.
The first logic can be implemented assuming full independence or can be amended by
relying on Fisher’s method.31 Using Fisher’s method in this application leads to a test statistic
with a p−value of 0.22 which does not allow to reject the null hypothesis of no fraud at any
conventional level (one test from Table 2, three from Table 3, three from Table 4, and six
from Table 6). This approach, however, entails the risk of overseeing single forms of fraud.
With a growing number of hypotheses, for which we test, we increase the level of the p−value,
31Following the logic one has a overall statistic which follows a binomial distribution with p = 0.95 and n = 4.
The probability of finding non significant test statistics in three instances and a significant test in one case
(three hypotheses are not supported by the data in this application) is p = (4
1
) ⋅ 0.953 ⋅ (1 − 0.95) = 0.17 which
does not warrant to reject the null hypothesis. Such a method is sensitive to the exact significance level one
choses as a rejected null hypothesis is counted as 1 and barely not rejected is counted as 0. That means that
relying on this approach we treat a p−value of 0.049 very different than a value of 0.051 although the difference
between these two values might not be significant (Gelman and Stern, 2006). There is a more precise way to
combine several p−values which dates back to Fisher (1948) and is known as Fisher’s method. It requires to
assume that the p−values are uniformly distributed and independent. If so, one can compute −2∑ki log(pi)
(where k indicates the number of p−values) and this sum follows under the null hypothesis a χ2 distribution
with 2k degrees of freedom (Westfall, 2005; Westfall and Wolfinger, 1997).
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which would be required to indicate fraud in any of the individual micro-scenarios. While we
capture a wider array of forms of fraud, it becomes thus more difficult to detect any single
form of it.
Instead, we could follow the second approach, treat every hypothesis separately, and if
any of them is not rejected, take this as a sign that there was fraud. Again, this may lead
to exaggerated claims of fraud when the number of tests is high. In this application one
would, based on the results in Table 2, claim that fraud has occurred. With more tests of
fraud conducted, the researcher will be more likely to find evidence of fraud. In the beginning
we have emphasized that it is of central importance that one first derives micro-logics which
explain how potential fraud could occur. This step and the necessity to justify the micro-
logics constrain the inclusion or exclusion of test results. This second approach also retains
the possibility to pin point where or how the fraud occurred.32 After implying that fraud
occurred, the immediate following question will be “How was fraud committed?” or “Who
committed fraud?” and this approach allows to have a clear answer to that question.
We support this second approach, for two reasons. First, fraud may only occur according
to one micro-logic. It is irrelevant how many other forms of fraud are tested, one should be
able to conclude that such an election was manipulated. As a safeguard against a uncontrolled
inflation of tests - which under the second approach eventually would produce one or the other
wrong indication of fraud - we restrain ourselves to derive precise micro-logics and justify our
choices.
In the application, analyzing the tax referendum of 2011, we have tested four distinct
fraudulent actions. The test results for three of the four tests are in line with a fair election.
Where the data and models raise a red flag is for the first hypothesis which states that left
empty fields in the tie-break question were manipulated. The result of that test supports the
argument of fraud – there are significantly less empty ballots in those thirty municipalities
than in the 342 other municipalities reported. Finding fraud for the most low-scale forms of
manipulation (here: hypothesis 1), but not for more demanding forms or more easily detectable
forms of fraud, is therefore in line with the expectations. With this reasoning, it should not
be worrisome, if one does not detect other, more costly forms of fraud. In hindsight it would
have been more troubling to find empirical support e.g. for the forth hypothesis.
32Note, that using Fisher’s method one can have a series of p−values of which none is below 0.05 but the
overall p−value is lower than 0.05 (example: five p−values of 0.15 lead to an overall p−value of 0.04).
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4.4 Where to Go From Here
The tests presented so far only use clearly quantifiable data and treat all potential micro-logics
as equally relevant and probable. Before any tests are carried out one has already an expecta-
tion of how likely each form of fraud is. In this application it can be argued that filing in empty
fields in the tie-break question (hypothesis 1) is more likely than outright mis-reporting of
vote totals (hypothesis 4). The psychological models of fraudulent behavior as well subjective
expectations do not enter these tests or their final evaluation. In the future, exploiting this
by adopting an explicitly Bayesian approach where one combines this information in form of
a prior promises an advance. Using Bayes’ rule faces a distinct challenges here as one will
have to have an unconditional probability function for fraud. Identifying ways to derive such
a function would enable the implementation of a Bayesian contribution to electoral forensics.
5 Conclusion
This paper is interested in electoral fraud and electoral forensics. We set out from the obser-
vation that most contributions in the field of electoral forensics rely on a specific tool. Our
main claim is that there is no one optimal test and that every tests needs to rest on a sound
basis. First, we start with the fraudulent act and show for a specific case how one can define
the different possible actions that can distort the true results. Second, we identify the wards,
where fraud is most likely to happen, and consider this information in the statistical tests.
This is guided by what we have labeled micro-logics and provides some prior expectation to
its likelihood. The two dimensions of these micro-logics are the probability of detection (and
possible prosecution) and the degree to which is contradicting the voters true intent. This
framework also allows us to derive prior expectations for the illustrative case of each acts like-
lihood. In a second step we parse out the empirical implications for each of these fraudulent
acts which may or may not have occurred. Despite the fact that we are only looking at one
vote, we find at least four distinct tests which in turn rely on four different potential acts.
Our illustrative case is the optional referendum on February 13th 2011 in the Swiss canton
of Berne. While there are no accusations of fraud, a re-count of the ballots, mandated by
courts, was impossible, because 30 out of 383 municipalities declared that they have lost the
ballots of the referendum in the meanwhile. One of these municipalities, after declaring that
they have shredded the ballots, found them again. A re-count could never take place. We do
not know what has happened in the 30 municipalities that declared their ballots as lost. The
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least harmful reason is sloppiness of the administration, the most harmful might be electoral
fraud. If there were irregularities, they regard the 30 municipalities that have lost their ballots.
We compare the election returns of the 342 other wards (usually: municipalities) in the same
canton. We do find empirical support for irregularities which could be due of the most likely
form of fraud. The Bernese ballot counts three referendum questions, the two main questions,
which are answered by ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, and the (not less important) tie-break question, answered
with a simple cross. We find that in the 30 municipalities which lost their ballots, fewer empty
ballots were counted for the tie-break question. This empirical pattern is consistent with the
hypothesis that some members of the electoral committee in the 30 municipalities might have
filled in empty tie-break answer boxes.
The counting of the votes is little professionalized, especially in the smaller municipalities
of Berne, and while the rules are clear, the cantonal administration has little knowledge
about the counting process in general. This lack of oversight does not only apply to Berne
but in more general to Switzerland. It was one of the few objections of the OSCE Election
Assessment Mission which observed the national elections in October 2011 (OSCE, 2012).
We remain agnostic whether those 30 municipalities actually tampered ballots by filling left
empty spaces and believe that there is need for reform. We would like to remind the critical
reader, convinced of the properness of the process, of the case in Wimmis in 1956.
This illustration shows how one can fruitfully combine different approaches and tools
rooted in theoretical micro-logics to the detection of electoral fraud. This framework allows
to go beyond mere digit checking a` la Benford’s law or comparisons of current electoral results
with historical results. The ultimate question, whether fraud actually occurred or not, remains
a question which cannot be answered with certainty – but the confidence in our probabilistic
assessments is greater once we put them on an appropriate theoretical foundation. Finding
irregularities then points to specific acts and procedure which can be subsequently further
analyzed.
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6 Online - Appendix
A.1: Predicted Probabilities for Four-Digit Numbers
Table 7: Predicted Probabilities
zi First Digit Second Digit Third Digit Forth Digit
0 0.00000 0.11968 0.10178 0.10018
1 0.30103 0.11389 0.10138 0.10014
2 0.17609 0.10882 0.10097 0.10010
3 0.12494 0.10433 0.10057 0.10006
4 0.09691 0.10031 0.10018 0.10002
5 0.07918 0.09668 0.09979 0.09998
6 0.06695 0.09337 0.09940 0.09994
7 0.05799 0.09035 0.09902 0.09990
8 0.05115 0.08757 0.09864 0.09986
9 0.04576 0.08500 0.09827 0.09982
We show the predicted probabilities
for each digit based on Hill’s (1995)
extensions. The table is taken from
Nigrini (1996) and is also reproduced
in Diekmann (2007). For the first
digit one finds the common distribu-
tion which displays a decay towards
larger values (zi). As one moves to
second and third digits the decay is
less pronounced and for the forth
digit it is almost a perfect uniform
distribution.
A.2: Testing Benford’s Law
We will compare the Pearson χ2 test to the modified K-S test (Stephens, 1970). The latter correction
takes the originally obtained K-S test statistic (D) and adjusts for the sample size according to Dnew =
Dold(√n+ 0.12+ 0.11/√n) whereas n is the sample size. We also rely on the adjusted critical value by
Morrow (2010) derived for a Benford distribution.
Figure 3: Comparing Rejection Rates
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Notes: The left plot shows the share of rejected null hypotheses. The right plot shows the share of digits in
the tested distribution. The underlaid histogram also shows the tested distribution with high frequencies of ‘3’
and ‘7’.
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To illustrate the different power of these two tests we will repeat both tests on sample from a distribution
which does not conform to the theoretical distribution, i.e. a perfect test would always reject H0 (that
the sample is from the theoretical distribution). We chose on purpose a distribution which is not trend
shaped, and thus likely works against the K-S test (Pettitt and Stephens, 1977). The motivation for
doing so is that experimental evidence shows that distributions which described fabricated data (fraud)
are multimodal and not trend-shaped (Diekmann, 2007). We draw 1,000 samples form the distribution
to be tested (see histogram in Figure 3) of each sample size and repeat all steps 100 times for each
condition. While this is not a power test in general it serves to illustrate that if the distribution is
actually multimodal one has greater power with a Pearson χ2 test than with a K-S test. It also shows
that the power of the χ2 test is small for samples of small size.
A.3: Mixture Distribution for Benford’s Law
In our application we will sometimes encounter votes from municipalities with only a few hundred
inhabitants and therefore some vote counts’ last digits are the second digit and others are the third
digit. Instead of brushing away the inconvenience of these small municipalities, we incorporate this
by employing a mixed distribution. Imagine we are testing 100 municipalities’ ‘yes’ votes and 50 of
these municipalities report two-digit numbers and 50 report three digit numbers. It would be wrong
to now focus on the last digit and just assume a uniform distribution (see plot b in Figure 4). Hence,
we accept this empirical mixture of two- and three-digit numbers and construct a theoretical distribu-
tion according to the data we have at hand.
Figure 4: Mixture Distribution
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Notes: The blue bars display the frequencies according to Benford’s law. The dashed line
indicates a uniform distribution.
We define Benford’s distribution as b1(x), b2(x), b3(x), ... where b1(x) is the distribution for the
first digit, b2(x) for the second digit and so on. In our example above we have 50% municipalities
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with a two-digit report and hence their last digit is the second digit. We also have 50% municipalities
with three digit report and hence the last digits are third digits. The theoretical distribution to test
against is then a mixture between b2(x) and b3(x). We define the theoretical distribution as mixture
based on the weights w1, w2, w3, ... and so on. In our example w1 = 0, w2 = 0.5, and w3 = 0.5.
Therefore the theoretical distribution is tB(x) = ∑iwi ∗ bi(x) and in our example this would be:
tB(x) = 12 ∗ b2(x)+ 12 ∗ b3(x). The hypothetical example is illustrated in Figure 4. The next subsection
provides an illustration with the reported municipal turnout in federal elections in 2007.
A.4: Example: Voter Turnout in Nine Cantons
To illustrate the digit based test we use municipality-level data on voter turnout for the national
elections on 2007 in nine cantons. We picked the first nine cantons which are well suited for the
illustration as the number of municipalities varies drastically (Berne: 387, Obwalden: 7). We run the
tests canton by canton as if we were testing whether there was vote fraud in a specific canton. We
ran the digit-based test on the results from all 25 cantons.33 In all 25 tests we fail to reject the null
hypothesis (digit distribution is Benford distribution) on a α-level of 0.05. If we were to be using a
higher level, e.g. 0.1, we would have rejected the null hypothesis twice – what is about in 8% of the
cases as we expect given that the data was truthfully reported. To do so, we first derive the theoretical
distribution for each canton as described in the above paragraph. Although these distributions are close
to uniform for the last digit, they slightly deviate, e.g. the largest value for tB(x)bern is 0.1017 instead
of 0.1. In Figure 5 we show the frequency of digits as well as the theoretical distribution. In cantons
with very few municipalities we find large deviations and in cantons with many municipalities we find a
good fit. Nevertheless, in all cantons the frequencies of the last digit follows the theoretical distribution
and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the digits stem from the theoretical distribution. Only
if we would find a significant deviation, we would use this as evidence for vote fraud.
The result we find for Obwalden (middle row, right column) is instructive regarding to the low
power of the test for small samples. There are only 7 municipalities in Obwalden. The test we are
using is based on frequencies of digits and the theoretical expectation. Hence, we are comparing three
observed ‘3’s’ with the theoretical expectation (≈ 0.7) and add the squared and weighted difference to
the differences found for every digit. If we rely on an α level of .95, the critical value is about 16.92.
With only four different digits found in this canton (‘3’, ‘5’, ‘6’, and ‘8’) we would have had to find at
least four same digits (e.g. 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4) to get a p-value lower than 0.05.
It is important to acknowledge that it is very hard to find a significant deviation from a theoretical
distribution in small samples. It is possible to boost power by increasing the α level, but the cost is
an increase in type-I-errors and given the substantive nature of this paper we would rather want to be
conservative. Hence, we stay with the conventional α level and rely in our analysis on larger samples
than 7 – effectively, the smallest sample we look at is 30 and most of them are 60 or larger than 300.
33Elections were scheduled in all 26 cantons but in the canton of Nidwalden there was only one candidate
and hence no vote took place.
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Figure 5: Digit Test for Nine different Cantons
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Notes: The blue bars display the frequencies according to the last reported digit. The grey
bars indicate the adequate Benford mixture distribution. The number in parenthesis reports
the number of municipalities in a canton. In each plot we also report the p-value.
A.5: List of Referednums
List of referendums considered to calibrate our control models (all cantonal referendums with people’s
amendments since 2004 included)
• Referendum of November 28th 2004, Law on public employment (Personalgesetz) with people’s
amendment
• Referendum of June 5th 2005, Law on hospitals (Spitalversorgungsgesetz) with people’s amend-
ment
• Referendum of February 24th 2008, Law on taxes (Steuergesetz) with people’s amendment
• Referendum of May 15th 2011, Cantonal law on energy (Kantonales Energiegesetz) with people’s
amendment
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A.6: Additional Tables
Table 8: Control model for H2
REFERENDUM Hopsital Taxes
Parliamentary People’s Tie-break Parliamentary People’s Tie-break
proposal amendment question proposal amendment question
Empty – PB 0.285** 0.155 0.057 0.121 -0.026 0.085
(-0.100) (0.106) (0.098) (0.082) (0.094) (0.086)
Empty – P’sA 0.039 0.202(*) 0.115 -0.016 0.364** -0.018
(0.096) (0.103) (0.090) (0.087) (0.134) (0.105)
Empty – TBq -0.012 -0.081 0.139(*) 0.057 -0.137 0.068
(0.063) (0.073) (0.083) (0.067) (0.087) (0.072)
French (d) 0.029** 0.016* 0.030** 0.022** 0.011 0.017*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Reg. voters (log) -0.002 -0.002 -0.005** -0.001 -0.008** -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Lost Ballots 0.005 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.01) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
constant 0.086** 0.075** 0.105** 0.044** 0.110** 0.076**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017)
N 372 372 372 372 372 372
R2 0.196 0.123 0.176 0.152 0.140 0.105
Note: OLS with robust standard errors. PB = Parliamentary Bill, P’sA = People’s Amendment,
TBq = Tie=break Question. (log)=logarithm, (d) = dummy. ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, and (∗)
p < 0.1.
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